It is well-known that Independence Friendly (IF) logic is equivalent to existential second-order logic (Σ 1 1 ) and, therefore, is not closed under classical negation. The Boolean closure of IF sentences, called Extended IF-logic, on the other hand, corresponds to a proper fragment of ∆ 1 2 . In this article we consider SL(↓), IF-logic extended with Hodges' flattening operator ↓, which allows to define a classical negation. Furthermore, this negation, in Hodges' style, may occur also under the scope of IF quantifiers. SL(↓) contains Extended IF-logic and hence it is at least as expressive as the Boolean closure of Σ 1 1 . We prove that SL(↓) corresponds to a weak syntactic fragment of SO which we show to be strictly contained in ∆ 1 2 . The separation is derived almost trivially from the fact that Σ 1 n defines its own truth-predicate. We finally show that SL(↓) is equivalent to the logic of Henkin quantifiers, which shows, we argue, that Hodges' notion of negation is adequate.
Introduction
Independence Friendly logic (IF, for short), introduced by Hintikka and Sandu [1] and became part of Hintikka's foundational programme for mathematics [2] , is an extension of first-order logic (FO) where each disjunction and each existential quantifier may be decorated with denotations of universally quantified variables, as in:
∀x∀y∃z |∀y ∃w |∀y [y ≈ z ∨ |∀x,∀y w ≈ y].
(
The standard interpretation of IF is through a variation of the classical game-theoretical semantics for FO: Eloïse's strategy function for a position of the form ∃x |∀y,∀z ψ or ψ ∨ |∀y,∀z χ, under valuation v, cannot depend on neither v(y) nor v(z). Thus, we say that a sentence ϕ is true in model A (notation, A |= + ϕ) if Eloïse has a winning strategy on the associated game; and that it is false (notation, A |= − ϕ) whenever Abélard has a winning strategy. Now, the fact that Eloïse's strategy may not take into account all the available information turns the game into one of imperfect information. Thus, certain formula-structure pairs may have a non-determined semantic game; that is, one in which neither of the players has a winning strategy. As an example of non-determinacy, consider this formula:
It is not hard to see that if A is a model with at least two elements, then A |= + χ 1 and A |= − χ 1 . One says that χ 1 is neither true nor false in A. In game-theoretical semantics, negation is interpreted as a switch of roles, i.e., Abélard plays on Eloïse's former positions and vice versa. We use ∼ to denote this form of negation and we refer to it as game negation. For any IF-formula ψ and any model A, A |= + ψ iff A |= − ∼ψ. (i.e., Eloïse has a winning strategy for ψ on A iff Abélard has one for ∼ψ on A). However, observe that ψ ∨ ∼ψ is not in general a valid IF-formula (e.g., take ψ to be χ 1 in (2)). This means that game negation in IF is not equivalent to classical negation, which will be denoted with ¬ and is characterized by:
Since the expressive power of IF corresponds to that of existential second-order logic (Σ Classical negation plays an important role in Hintikka's original programme. In [2] , he claims that "virtually all of classical mathematics can in principle be done in extended IF first-order logic" (in a way that is ultimately "reducible" to plain IF logic). What he calls "(truth-functionally) extended IF logic" is the closure of the set of IF-sentences with operators ¬, ∧ and ∨. Clearly, extended IF logic corresponds in expressive power to the Boolean closure of Σ 1 1 , which is known to be a proper fragment of ∆ 1 2 [4, 5] . Hodges [6] shows that IF logic admits a Tarski-style compositional semantics and then extends his presentation to account also for extended IF. To support classical negation, he introduces the flattening operator ↓, which "restores two-valued logic on sentences" [6, p. 556] . That is, extended IF is obtained, roughly speaking, by considering the formulas where ↓ only occurs on certain positions (roughly speaking, ∼↓ can occur where ¬ would occur in extended IF logic, see below). But because ↓ is given a compositional semantics, the logic where it is allowed to occur anywhere in a formula is well-defined. The natural question to ask is what is the logic one thus obtains, and this is the main topic of this paper.
One might suspect the resulting logic to be extremely expressive: freely combining classical negation with second order existential quantifiers leads to full second-order logic (SO). We will show that this is not the case: IF with unrestricted classical negation, in Hodges' style, corresponds to a rather mild fragment of SO, which is properly contained in ∆ 1 2 . This will be the subject of Section 4. The separation from ∆ 1 2 is based on known results on truth-definitions for the analytical hierarchy [7, 8] that, for the sake of completeness, are presented in Section 6.
Hodges' overall presentation is based on a mild extension of IF, called slash logic (SL), in which independence restrictions can occur in any connective (instead of only on ∃ and ∨). The unique feature of his compositional semantics is that the free variables are interpreted using a set of variable assignments (called deals), instead of just a variable assignment as in usual Tarksi-style semantics for FO. In his terminology, a trump for a given game is a non-empty set of deals, V , such that some uniform strategy for Eloïse is winning for every game starting with any v ∈ V . To support classical negation, he extends slash logic with the flattening operator ↓. If we denote a set of variable assignments with V , its semantics can be given by:
Then one defines ¬ϕ as ∼↓ϕ and it is easy to verify that when restricted to formulas evaluated under a set composed of a single assignment {v} (we omit the braces for readability), negation behaves as expected:
It is worth stressing out that the asymmetry in clauses (4) and (5) , which in turns reflects in the asymmetry in (6) and (7) is fine. For instance, if in (5) the |= + were replaced by |= − then one would have that ¬ behaves exactly as ∼. Observe also that the semantics of ↓ is biased towards falsity: if a sentence ϕ in SL is neither true nor false then ↓ϕ is false. Thus, when working with ↓, the adequate notion to study is being true (|= + ) vs. not true ( |= + ) instead of being true vs. false. This is why we will study only the notion |= + in the context of SL with the operator ↓.
Hodges' slash logic with flattening (SL(↓)) admits a more convenient second-order game semantics, in which Abélard and Eloïse play what can be regarded as strategy functions for the standard game for SL. This will be the topic of Section 2; for a proof of the equivalence with the original compositional semantics, the reader is referred to [9] . Arguably, it could be possible that the semantics given to the flattening operator only made sense when restricted to sentences. Put in other words, it is not clear a priori that Hodges' characterization of classical negation for IF is the correct one. We investigate this in Section 5; we will see that SL(↓) coincides with the logic of Henkin quantifiers. The latter can be seen as the closure by (classical) negation of the logic in which only one top-level Henkin quantifier can be used, which is known to be equivalent to IF.
Some of the results contained in the present paper appeared in [10] .
Syntax and semantics of SL(↓)
We assume a fixed first-order relational language L, as well as a collection of first-order variables, which we will denote x, y, z, perhaps with subindices. Formulas of SL(↓), in negation normal form, correspond to the following grammar:
where ρ denotes a (possibly empty) finite set of variables and l(x 1 , . . . , x k ) is any first-order literal (i.e., an atom or a negated atom). We will typically use ∃x i , ∀x i , ∨ and ∧ instead of ∃x i|∅ , ∀x i|∅ , ∨ |∅ and ∧ |∅ . Since we are working in negation normal form, game negation ∼ will be a mapping on formulas satisfying ∼∀x i|ρ ϕ = ∃x i|ρ ∼ϕ; ∼↓ϕ = ↑∼ϕ, etc. Finally, ¬ϕ will be short for ∼↓ϕ. Bv(ϕ) and Fv(ϕ) denote the sets of bound and free variables of ϕ, respectively, which are defined as in the classical case with the proviso that variables mentioned in independence restrictions are considered free; e.g., Fv(∃x |ρ ϕ) = (Fv(ϕ) \ {x}) ∪ ρ (see [9] for a formal definition). A sentence is a formula with no free variables. A fresh variable for a formula is a variable that is not bound nor free for that formula [11, 12] . In order to give a formal account of the semantics of this logic, we need to refer to the live variables for a subformula ψ of ϕ (here we assume that ψ denotes not only a formula but a concrete node in the derivation tree of ϕ). Intuitively, these are the free variables of ϕ plus any variable y that would be bound by a quantifier if we substituted ψ by y ≈ y in ψ (cf. [13] ). Formally, the set Lv ϕ (ψ) is defined inductively from top down as follows:
2. If ψ occurs in ϕ under ∈ {∼, ↓, ↑}, then Lv ϕ (ψ) = Lv ϕ ( ψ).
3. If ψ occurs in ϕ in the form ψ χ (resp. χ ψ), with ∈ {∨ |ρ , ∧ |ρ }, then Lv ϕ (ψ) = Lv ϕ (ψ χ) (resp., Lv ϕ (ψ) = Lv ϕ (χ ψ)).
If ψ occurs in ϕ under
Qx |ρ with Q ∈ {∃, ∀}, then Lv ϕ (ψ) = Lv ϕ (Qx |ρ ψ) ∪ {x}.
Remark 1.
For the sake of simplicity we will impose a further restriction on formulas: there can be no nested bindings of the same variable (e.g., ∃x∃xϕ) nor a variable that occurs both free and bound in a formula (e.g., x ≈ y ∨ ∃xϕ or ∃x |x ϕ). This is called the regular fragment of SL(↓) [12] and it has simpler formal semantics. The results in this paper apply to the whole language under the proviso that history-preserving valuations are used instead of standard ones (cf. [9] for details).
We interpret SL(↓)-formulas using first-order models A with domain |A|. We use sets of finite valuations to account for free variables; the domains of these valuations must be large enough to interpret them all (but they can be larger).
Definition 1.
Given ϕ and A, we say that, V , a set of finite valuations over A, is suitable for ϕ iff there is a finite set D ⊇ Fv(ϕ) such that V ⊆ |A| D and D ∩ Bv(ϕ) = ∅ (cf. [12] ). We say that a finite valuation v over A is suitable whenever {v} is suitable.
We define now the game G(A, ϕ, V ), where A is a model and V is a set of finite valuations over A suitable for ϕ. As is customary, this game is played between two opponents: Abélard and Eloïse (sometimes called Falsifier and Verifier ). There is also a third agent, called Nature, which acts either as a generator of random choices or as a referee.
The board Game G(A, ϕ, V ) is played over the syntactic tree of ϕ. There is, additionally, a set of variables D and a placeholder for a valuation v : D → |A|. Initially, D is such that V ⊆ |A| D and v is empty. In the syntactic tree of ϕ, all the ∃, ∨ and ↓-nodes of the tree belong to Eloïse; while the ∀, ∧ and ↑-nodes belong to Abélard. Moreover, ∃, ∀, ∨ and ∧-nodes will be (repeatedly) decorated with functions during the game; the first two admit any function f : |A| D∪Lv ϕ (ψ) → |A|; the last two, only functions f : |A| D∪Lv ϕ (ψ) → {L, R}, where ψ stands for the formula that corresponds to the node in question. Initially, the nodes have no decoration.
The turns At any point of the game, the remaining number of turns is bounded by the maximum number of nested occurrences of ↓-nodes and ↑-nodes in the game-board.
• The opening turn. The first turn is different from the rest. It is composed of two clearly distinguished phases. In the first phase, both players decorate all their nodes with suitable functions. The order in which they tag their nodes is not important as long as they do not get to see their opponent's choices in advance. For simplicity, we will assume they both play simultaneously. In the second phase, Nature picks a valuation from V and puts it in the placeholder v and finally evaluates the outcome of the turn, as described below.
• The subsequent turns. In all but the first turn, the formula tree is of the form ↓ψ or ↑ψ (see next). In these turns, both players get to redecorate their nodes, one after the other; Eloïse goes first when the formula tree is of the form ↓ψ and Abélard does so on ↑ψ. Finally, Nature replaces the tree with ψ and proceeds to evaluate.
The recursive evaluation procedure used by Nature is the following:
R1 If the tree has root ψ, of the form ψ 1 ∨ |y 1 ,...,y k ψ 2 or ψ 1 ∧ |y 1 ,...,y k ψ 2 , then ψ must have been decorated with a function f : |A| D∪Lv ϕ (ψ) → {L, R}. Nature picks elements a 1 . . . a k from |A| and proceeds to evaluate
That is, the values the player was not supposed to consider are randomly replaced prior to evaluating the function provided. The tree is then updated with ψ 1 , if the result is L, and with ψ 2 , otherwise. D and v remain unchanged and evaluation proceeds.
R2
If the tree has root ψ, of the form ∃x |y 1 ,...,y k ψ or ∀x |y 1 ,...,y k ψ, then ψ must have been decorated with a function f : |A| D∪Lv ϕ (ψ) → |A|. Nature picks a 1 . . . a k , evaluates
) and records this choice by replacing D with D ∪ {x} and v with v ∪ {x → b}. Finally, the tree is updated with ψ and evaluation proceeds.
R3 If the tree is of the form ↓ψ or ↑ψ, the evaluation ends (and so does the turn). Remark 2. Let ϕ be ↓-and ↑-free; then game G(A, ϕ, V ) consists of only one turn, but the evaluation phase is essentially the usual game for SL (and, mutatis mutandis, for IF), except that Abélard and Eloïse are substituted by the (strategy) functions they already played.
Winning strategies We will not go into a formal description of what a strategy for G(A, ϕ, V ) is. We simply take it to be a form of oracle that tells the player how to proceed in each turn. As usual, a strategy is said to be winning for a player if it guarantees that the he or she will win every instance of the game, regardless the strategy of the opponent and the choices made by Nature.
Definition 2. Let V be a set of finite valuations suitable for ϕ. We define:
iff Eloïse has a winning strategy for the game G(A, ϕ, V ); . This is due to signaling: the value of a variable a player is supposed not to know is available through the value of another one (cf. [14, 15] ). It is shown in [9] that the logic of Definition 2 coincides with Hodges' compositional semantics for SL(↓) described in Section 1.
We will work with two different kind of equivalences.
Definition 3 (Equivalence). We say that ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are equivalent (notation:
, for every A and every set V suitable for ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 .
On the other hand, we resort to a coarser notion of equivalence which only considers singletons V = {v}. We need this in order to compare SL(↓) with "classical" logics such as second order logic (whose formulas are evaluated in classical valuations).
Definition 4 (Equivalence on classical contexts). We say that ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are equivalent on classical contexts (notation: 
Proof. The left-to-right directions hold for all V . For the remaining case, note that Nature's initial choice of a valuation is irrelevant in this case, so if a player has a winning strategy playing first, this same strategy can be used for the case where they play simultaneously.
To see that Proposition 1 fails when V is not a singleton set, consider |A| = {a, b} and V = {{x → a}, {x → b}}. It is easy to verify that for ϕ = ∃y |x [x ≈ y] we have A |= + ↓ϕ[V ] (since Eloïse knows the valuation picked by Nature, she can play a constant function for her existential) while A |=
Remark 3. Nodes may get redecorated during the game but only by its owner, that is fixed. Hence it is equivalent to assume that players decorate only those nodes that are not under nested ↓ or ↑. This way, each node gets decorated only once. Moreover, whenever one is interested in whether A |= + ↓ϕ[V ] holds, it may be convenient to consider an equivalent version of G(A, ↓ϕ, V ) in which Eloïse plays functions and Abélard plays elements (until the game reaches a ↑, where the situation gets reversed). This resembles the perfect-information game for IF given by Väänänen in [16] .
Under some assumptions, operators ↓ and ↑ turn a formula that may lead to a nondetermined game, into one that always leads to a determined one. This suggests the following notion.
Definition 5 (Determined). We say that ϕ is determined whenever, for every model A, and every set V suitable for ϕ, A |=
. All such formulas constitute the determined fragment of SL(↓).
Intuitively, determined formulas are those that have a well-defined truth-value on every structure. One would like that first-order formulas (i.e., those with no independence restrictions) be determined. However this is not the case: the formula x ≈ y is not determined when |A| = {a, b} and V = {{x → a, y → b}, {x → a, y → a}}. Here the problem resides in the fact that first-order (as well as any logic in classical context, say second-order) involve single valuations instead of sets of valuations. Furthermore, though ↓ "restores two-valued logic on sentences", it is not true that it restores a two-valued logic on any first order formula, as ↓(x ≈ y) is not determined for A and V defined above.
We restrict Definition 5 in order to guarantee that each first-order formula now behaves as we want, and also to ensure that ↓ and ↑ "determine" a formula. The idea is to consider not arbitrary V , but singletons V = {v}.
Definition 6 (Determined on classical contexts). We say that ϕ is determined on classical contexts (CC-determined for short) whenever, for every model A, and every finite valuation v suitable for ϕ, A |=
. All such formulas constitute the CC-determined fragment of SL(↓).
Of course, not every SL(↓) formula is CC-determined. For instance the formula in (2) is not CC-determined. The following result establishes some sufficient conditions for a formula to be CC-determined: Proposition 2. The following hold:
1. Every FO formula is a CC-determined formula.
2. ↓ψ and ↑ψ are CC-determined formulas.
3. If ϕ and ψ are CC-determined, so are ϕ ∧ |∅ ψ, ϕ ∨ |∅ ψ, ∃x |∅ ϕ and ∀x |∅ ϕ.
Proof. For 1, suppose ϕ is a FO formula. If A |= ϕ[v] (i.e. ϕ is true in A under v with the classic first-order semantics) then Eloïse just plays the winning strategy for the classical game-theoretical semantics for FO, which is a valid winning strategy for the game G(A, ϕ, v).
For 2, observe that by (4) and (5) we have that A |=
For 3, observe that on the one hand, A |=
is true, and the same for ψ, then one of A |=
Since ϕ is CCdetermined, one of these two must hold. The case for ∀x |∅ ϕ is analogous.
As was mentioned in the introduction, the semantics of ↓ is biased towards falsity:
Observe that this is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 1 and item 2 of Proposition 2.
Normal forms for SL(↓)
Normal forms in the context of SL were initially investigated in [13] . Later, Janssen [14] observed some anomalies which cast doubt on the correctness of these results. However, it was shown in [12] , [11] and [9] that only the formal apparatus employed in [13] was defective, and not the results per se.
In this section we revisit the prenex normal form results of [13] and extend them to account for ↓ and ↑. For this, bound variables will be tacitly renamed when necessary 1 and the following formula manipulation tools will be employed.
Definition 7. Let x 1 . . . x n be variables not occurring in ϕ; we denote with ϕ |x 1 ...xn the formula obtained by adding x 1 . . . x n as restrictions to every quantifier, every conjunction and every disjunction in ϕ. Also, we write ϕ c for the formula obtained by replacing all independence restrictions in ϕ by ∅.
Notice that ϕ c is essentially a FO formula. As is observed in [13] , independence restrictions on Boolean connectives can be removed by introducing additional quantifications. It is not hard to extend this result to SL(↓). In what follows, we shall use, for emphasis, ∨ |∅ and ∧ |∅ instead of ∨ and ∧, etc.
Theorem 3. For every ϕ, there exists a ϕ such that ϕ ≡ ϕ and every disjunction (resp. conjunction) in ϕ is of the form ψ 1 ∨ |∅ ψ 2 (resp. ψ 1 ∧ |∅ ψ 2 ).
Proof. When restricted to models with at least two elements, a simple inductive argument gives us the desired formula. The important step is that, given a formula ψ := ψ 1 ∨ |x 1 ...x k ψ 2 and given y 1 , y 2 fresh for ψ, we can define
Fact 4. On models A with at least two elements, we have A |=
Proof.
. We transform Eloïse's winning strategy on G(A, ψ, V ) into a winning strategy of Eloïse for G(A, ψ * , V ). Suppose Eloïse plays a {L, R}-valued function f for the outermost node ∨ |x 1 ...x k of ψ and let a, b ∈ |A| be two distinct elements. Then Eloïse plays the following |A|-valued functions g 1 and g 2 for the outermost nodes ∃y 1 |x 1 ...x k and ∃y 2 |x 1 ...x k of ψ * respectively, and an {L, R}-valued function h for the outermost node ∨ of
The rest of Eloïse's strategy in G(A, ψ * , V ) is the one she has in G(A, ψ, V ). Observe that g 1 (v) and g 2 (v) can be determined independently of the values of x 1 . . . x k because f (v) is determined in that way. It is not hard to check that these definitions of g 1 , g 2 and h are winning for Eloïse in G(A, ψ * , V ).
. We transform Eloïse's winning strategy on G(A, ψ * , V ) into a winning strategy of Eloïse for G(A, ψ, V ). Suppose Eloïse plays |A|-valued functions g 1 and g 2 for the outermost nodes ∃y 1 |x 1 ...x k and ∃y 2 |x 1 ...x k of ψ * respectively. Then we define the function f for the outermost node ∨ |x 1 ...x k of ψ as follows:
Since the value of g 1 (v) and g 2 (v) can be determined independently of x 1 . . . x k then so is the determination of the value for f (v). One can check that this definition of f (together with the rest of Eloïse's strategy for G(A, ψ * , V )) constitutes a winning strategy for Eloïse in G(A, ψ, V ).
It is straightforward to see that A |=
By successively applying this truth-preserving transformation in a top-down manner, one can obtain, for any given ϕ, a formulaφ that is equivalent on models with at least two elements.
On models with exactly one element, restrictions are meaningless. Therefore, for any given ϕ we can define the equivalent formula:
Formula (9) in the above proof was taken from [13] , except that we have added independences on y 1 and y 2 to ψ 1 and ψ 2 . This prevents undesired signaling [14, 15, 12, 9] and it was most probably an involuntary omission in [13] . Also, since we are considering only suitable valuations, the following result in [13] is now true.
Lemma 5. If x does not occur in ψ, then the following hold:
The above result is a basic building block for a proof of a prenex normal form theorem. In the case of SL(↓), we also need to show how to extract ↓ and ↑ from arbitrary formulas.
Lemma 6. The following hold:
Proof. Item 1 follows straightforwardly from Proposition 1.
For the first equivalence of item 2, suppose that A |= + ↓(ϕ ∧ |∅ ψ) [v] ; this means that Eloïse has a way of decorating both ϕ and ψ that guarantees she wins each game. Therefore, we have A |=
. The right to left direction is analogous, and one thus establishes that A |=
. For the first equivalence of item 3, suppose that A |= + ↓(ϕ ∨ |∅ ψ) [v] ; this means that Eloïse has a way of decorating either ϕ or ψ (or both) that guarantees she wins the corresponding game. Therefore, we have A |=
The second equivalences of items 2 and 3 are dual of the first equivalences of items 3 and 2 respectively. Proof. By Theorem 3 we can obtain a ϕ such that ϕ ≡ c ϕ and no Boolean connective in it contains independences. We proceed now by induction on ϕ . If ϕ is a literal, ϕ * = ϕ . If ϕ = ∃x |y 1 ...y k ψ, we have ϕ * = ∃x |y 1 ...y k ψ * and the cases for ϕ = ∀x |y 1 ...y k ψ, ϕ = ↓ψ and ϕ = ↑ψ are analogous. We analyze now the case for ϕ = ψ ∨ χ; the one for ϕ = ψ ∧ χ is symmetrical.
We need to show that there exists a ϕ * ≡ c (ψ * ∨ χ * ), in prenex normal form. We do it by induction on the sum of the lengths of the prefixes of ψ * and χ * . The base case is trivial; for the inductive case we show that one can always "extract" the outermost operator of either ψ * or χ * . The first thing to note is that if ψ * = Qx |y 1 ...y k ψ (Q ∈ {∀, ∃}), then using Lemma 5 (renaming variables, if necessary) we have ϕ * := Qx |y 1 ...y k (ψ ∨ χ * ) * and the same applies to the case χ * = Qx |y 1 ...y k χ . So suppose now that neither ψ * nor χ * has a quantifier as outermost operator. In that case, they start with one of ↓ or ↑, or they contain only ∧ |∅ , ∨ |∅ and literals. In either case, they are both CC-determined and at least one of them starts with ↓ or ↑ (or we would be in the base case). If we assume that ψ * = ↓ψ , using Lemma 6 repeatedly, we have (↓ψ ∨ χ
, and we can apply the inductive hypothesis. The remaining cases are analogous.
Observe that in the proof above, the formula ϕ * obtained is (strongly) equivalent to the given ϕ if there are no occurrences of ↓ nor ↑ in ϕ (i.e., ϕ ∈ SL). Moreover, in that case, no ↓ nor ↑ are introduced in the resulting ϕ * . Hence, we obtain the following result (cf. 
Weak dependencies in second-order logic
It is not hard to encode in a SO-formula the game semantics of a CC-determined formula of SL(↓): quantification over Skolem functions accounts for the functions that can be played by a player while first-order quantification is used for the rival's moves (cf. Remark 3). This will be shown in detail in the proof of Theorem 16 (item 1), but we can now anticipate an interesting feature of this translation: if ϕ is a formula obtained from it and ∃f ψ is a second-order quantification that occurs inside ϕ, then although f formally depends on any previously quantified function g, in practice it only depends on a finite number of values of such g. This motivates the fragment of SO we are about to introduce which, moreover, will be shown to coincide with SL(↓) (with respect to |= + ).
Assumption 9.
In what follows we assume, without loss of generality, that if a variable occurs free in a SO-formula, it does not also appear bound. We reserve letters f , g and h (probably with subindices) to denote second-order functional variables; arities will be left implicit. We identify first-order variables with 0-ary second-order variables; letters x, y and z (with subindices) are to be interpreted always as 0-ary functions (f , g, etc. could be 0-ary too, unless stated). We also assume, as is customary, that only FO terms occur in SO-formulas (the occurrence of a proper SO terms as in the formula f ≈ g for f, g unary may be replaced by ∀x[f (x) ≈ g(x)]).
Definition 10. We say that an occurrence of the functional symbol f is strongly free in a SO-formula ϕ whenever f is free in ϕ and, if the occurrence in question is of the form f (. . . g(. . . ) . . . ), then the occurrence of g is strongly free in ϕ too. We say that f is strongly free in ϕ if all its occurrences are strongly free.
, while f is not (for x is not, either). Any free first-order variable is also strongly free.
Lemma 9. Let ϕ be a SO-formula and let g 1 . . . g k be strongly free in ϕ. Moreover, let v 1 and v 2 be interpretations of functional variables in A such that (i)
Proof. First we analyze a condition over terms:
If ϕ is quantifier-free and t is a term occurring in ϕ, v 1 (t) = v 2 (t).
Proof. By induction on the complexity of the term t. If t is a constant symbol it is straightforward. If t is of the form h(t 1 , . . . , t m ) (or a first-order variable in case m = 0) then by inductive hypothesis for all i = 1 . . . m we have v 1 (t i ) = v 2 (t i ). In case h / ∈ {g 1 , . . . , g k }, by clause (i) we have v 1 (h) = v 2 (h) and therefore v 1 (t) = v 2 (t). In case h = g i for some i then by clause (ii), we conclude v 1 (t) = v 2 (t).
We now show the statement of the lemma by induction on the complexity of ϕ. Suppose ϕ is of the form P (t 1 , . . . , t m ), where P is an m-ary relation symbol and t 1 , . . . , t m are terms. By Fact 10,
. The Boolean cases for ϕ are straightforward. Finally, suppose ϕ is of the form ∃f ψ. Observe that if g 1 . . . g k are strongly free in ϕ, then f / ∈ {g 1 , . . . , g k }; furthermore, g 1 , . . . , g k are also strongly free in ψ. Let v 1 and v 2 be interpretations of the variables satisfying the hypothesis and suppose that A |= SO 
It is well-known that ∀x 1 . . . x n ∃f ϕ is equivalent to ∃f ∀x 1 . . . x nφ , whereφ is obtained by replacing every occurrence of a term of the form f (t 1 , . . . , t k ) in ϕ byf (t 1 , . . . , t k , x 1 , . . . , x n ). The following is a generalization of this idea to strongly free second-order variables used instead of first-order ones.
Theorem 11. Let g 1 . . . g n be strongly free in ϕ and let h, free in ϕ, be such that g i (. . . h(. . . ) . . . ) does not occur in ϕ. Then, for every f 1 . . . f m free in ϕ, there existsφ such that g 1 . . . g n are strongly free inφ; f 1 . . . f m are free inφ and ∀g 1 . . . ∀g n ∃h∃f 1 . . . ∃f m ϕ ≡ ∃h∀g 1 . . . ∀g n ∃f 1 . . . ∃f mφ .
Proof. The idea is to move 'h to the front' using the fact that h does not depend on all the values of g i , but only on finitely many of them.
Let T be the set of terms of the form g i (t 1 , . . . t p i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, occurring in ϕ. Since g 1 , . . . , g n are strongly free in ϕ, for each term g i (t 1 , . . . t p i ) ∈ T and for each j ∈ {1, . . . , p i } we have that t j is a term built from constant and function symbols of the language, from variables occurring free in ∀g 1 . . . ∀g n ∃h∃f 1 . . . ∃f m ϕ, and from f 1 , . . . , f m -observe that the hypothesis precludes h to occur in t j . Hence h only depends on the terms in T . Suppose T = {s 1 , . . . , s l }, suppose h has arity k, and considerh of arity k + l. Defineφ as the result of replacing every occurrence of h(t 1 , . . . , t k ) in ϕ byh(t 1 , . . . ,t k , s 1 , . . . , s l ), wheret i is the result of the recursive replacement of h byh in t i , for i = 1, . . . , k. Since g i (. . . h(. . . ) In a way, what Theorem 11 says is that a strongly free second-order variable corresponds, in terms of information, to a finite number of first-order terms. Quantification over strongly free second-order variables introduces only "weak" dependencies between them. This is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 11. We say that a SO-formula in prenex normal form has weak dependencies if in every subformula of the form ∀g 1 . . . ∀g n ∃f 1 . . . ∃f m ϕ (with ϕ = ∃hψ) or ∃g 1 . . . ∃g n ∀f 1 . . . ∀f m ϕ (ϕ = ∀hψ), g 1 . . . g n are strongly free in ϕ. This notion is extended to an arbitrary formula ϕ requiring that the prenex normal forms induced by the branches of the derivation tree of the formula have weak dependencies. We use SO w to denote the fragment of SO-formulas with weak dependencies.
It is immediate that SO
w is closed under Boolean operations. Moreover, it is not hard (though perhaps rather tedious) to verify that it is also closed under some standard transformations:
Proposition 12. Every SO w -formula is equivalent to a SO w -formula with only shallow terms (i.e., if g(t 1 , . . . , t n ) occurs in the formula, all the t i are first-order variables) and the same number of quantifier alternations. Every SO w -formula is equivalent to a SO w -formula in prenex normal form, with the same number of quantifier alternations and containing no new terms. Both transformations are primitive recursive.
Proof. Let ϕ be a SO w -formula. For the first statement, suppose that for some relation symbol P , the atomic formula P (. . . g(t 1 , . . . , t n ) . . . ) occurs in ϕ, where some t i is not a first order variable. Then define ϕ as the replacement of P (. . . g(t 1 , . . . , t n ) . . . ) in ϕ by g(x 1 , . . . , x n ) . . . ), where x 1 . . . x n are fresh variables, or by
if the first replacement increases the number of quantifier alternations in the resulting formula. Repeating this process for every atomic subformula of the form P (. . . g(t 1 , . . . , t n ) . . . ) where some t i is not a first order variable, we obtain the desired equivalent SO w -formula. The second statement is a straightforward consequence of the following facts, since we only need to show that the quantifiers can be moved step by step to the front of the formula. Firstly, whenever f is not free in ψ then (Qf ϕ) ψ ≡ Qf (ϕ ψ), if Q ∈ {∀, ∃} and ∈ {∨, ∧}. Secondly, (Qf ϕ) ψ is a SO w -formula if and only if Qf (ϕ ψ) is so. Finally, an analogous rule for negation holds.
It is routine to check that these two transformations are primitive recursive.
The natural question now is what is the expressive power of this weak fragment. We provide both upper and lower bounds. 
where ρ is first order, Q k = ∀ if k is odd and Q k = ∃ otherwise, ∃ h [∀ g] is a possibly empty list of existential [universal] quantifiers, and ∀ f 2n+1 [∃ f 2n+2 ] is a nonempty list of universal [existential] quantifiers, and not all symbols in f k are 0-ary. We say that Q i f i is the i-th misplaced block. Clearly ϕ has no misplaced blocks if and only if ψ is Σ 1 2 . We now turn to the proof. Being SO w closed under negations, it suffices to show a primitive recursive translation from SO w to Σ 1 2 . We actually show that the quantifiers in the prenex normal form of a SO w -formula with shallow terms (cf. Proposition 12) can be reordered, one at a time, in a top-down manner, leading to a Σ 1 2 -formula. That this is a primitive recursive procedure will be immediate.
Suppose, then, that ϕ ∈ SO w is in prenex normal form, it only has shallow terms and it is not in Σ Observe that if k + m > 0 the only misplaced block that changes from ϕ to ϕ is the first one (all the others remain the same). In this case the length of the first misplaced block in ϕ has length k + m + 1, while the length of the first misplaced block in ϕ has length k + m. Hence (ϕ ) < (ϕ). In case k + m = 0 then ϕ has one less misplaced block than ϕ, but in this case it is also true that (ϕ ) < (ϕ). By inductive hypotheses, we can transform ϕ into a Σ 1 2 -formula.
2. All the symbols of the first misplaced block are 0-ary. Here it can be the case that g i (. . . x j . . . ) occurs in ψ. Therefore, suppose
where l ≥ 0, k, m, n ≥ 1, the variables x 1 , . . . , x k are all first-order, and ψ does not start with ∀. In this case we relocate the quantifiers corresponding to the second misplaced block. Using Theorem 11 repeatedly (recall that x 1 . . . x k are strongly free in ψ), we obtain the equivalent
Observe that ϕ is a SO w -formula, since ∀g 1 . . . ∀g n ∀f 1 . . . ∀f m ∃x 1 . . . ∃x kψ is one too. As one can see all the misplaced blocks of ϕ are also misplaced blocks of ϕ, but ϕ has one less misplaced block than ϕ, namely ∀f 1 . . . ∀f m . This implies that (ϕ ) < (ϕ) and by inductive hypothesis ϕ can be transformed into an equivalent Σ 1 2 -formula. The proof straightforwardly induces a primitive recursive procedure for converting ϕ into a Σ 1 2 -formula.
It will be shown in Section 6 that any logic that can be translated both to Σ Definition 12. Let ϕ ∈ SL(↓) and ψ ∈ SO w . We say that ϕ and ψ are equivalent, denoted ϕ . ≡ ψ, whenever for every structure A and every suitable valuation v, A |= 2. For every ψ ∈ SO w , there is a ψ ∈ SL(↓) such that ψ . ≡ ψ.
For the proof of item 1 of Theorem 16, we will use an Skolemization to show that the existence of a winning strategy for Eloïse in a game G(ϕ, A, {v}) for a ϕ in prenex normal form can be expressed as SO w -formula. We first motivate this sort of Skolem form with a short example; so let ψ be quantifier-free, with variables among {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 } and consider:
χ 2 := ↓∀y 1 ∀y 2 ∃x 1|y 2 ↑∃x 2|y 2 ∃x 3 ∀y 3 |x 3 ψ
Assume Eloïse has a winning strategy for G(A, χ 2 , {v}). Using the simplification of Remark 3 this is the case if and only if A |= SO χ 2 , where
and
} is a substitution of variables by terms 2 . Notice that z 1 and z 2 represent the random choices made by Nature during the evaluation phases; e.g., f (y 1 , z 1 ) expresses that Nature replaced the value of y 2 by a randomly picked z 1 when evaluating x 1 . Since z 1 and z 2 do not occur in ψ and y 1 and y 2 occur universally quantified, just as g, we have that χ 2 is equivalent to χ 2 , where
and σ 2 = {x 1 → f (y 1 ), y 3 → g(f (y 1 ), x 2 )}. Of course, one could simplify further and replace g(f (y 1 ), x 2 ) by g(x 2 ), but this will be discussed in more detail later on. In order to formalize this transformation, we will use some conventions. First, λ denotes an empty sequence (of quantifiers, of variables, etc.). When describing SL(↓) prefixes we shall use patterns such as
it must be understood that not necessarily all the x i and y i are present in the prefix, and that either Q = λ or else ∈ {↓, ↑} and Q is a (possibly empty) SL(↓)-prefix. 1 ∃x 1|ρ 
Here, we assumed α := α, y 1 . . . y k and β := β, x 1 . . . x k .
The reader should verify that, modulo variable names, T (χ 2 ) = χ 2 . In particular, substitution application in f x i (α \ ρ i )σ and g y i (β \ ρ i )σ account for the introduction of nested terms like g(x 2 , f (y 1 )) in (13) .
Lemma 17. For every ϕ ∈ SL(↓) in prenex normal form, every model A and every suitable valuation v, A |=
Proof. First, observe that A |=
. One then can show that, for every ψ in prenex normal form and every suitable v, A |=
by induction on the number of turns in G(A, ↓ψ, {v}) (i.e., in the number of ↓ and ↑ occurring in ↓ψ).
The base case is as follows. Suppose ϕ is of the form
where ψ is quantifier-free. In the game G(A, ϕ, {v}), Eloïse has a winning strategy if she can decorate her nodes (i.e. those containing an existential quantifier) such that for any decoration of Abélard's nodes, she wins the game G(A, ψ, {v}). She must decorate the node ∃x i|ρ i with an |A|-valued function depending on all the variables in the scope of this node in the syntactic tree of ϕ. Because of Nature's action in the evaluation phase, this function turns out to be equivalent to a one whose value is independent on the values of the variables in ρ i . Hence Eloïse has a winning strategy if and only if for each i, there is a function f x i which depends only on the variables in the context of ∃x i|ρ i except the variables in ρ i and such that for any choice y j of Abélard in his node ∀y j |τ j , the SO formula
is true in A under v, whereψ is the result of replacing x i by f x i ( z), for the adequate z, as explained above. One can verify that T (ϕ) = ϕ . Observe that all the existential quantifiers are in front of all the universal quantifiers because Eloïse has to play first (as she owns the initial ↓ node), and Abélard has to do it in second place. Observe also that it suffices to consider first order universal quantifiers because we are analyzing the case when Eloïse has a winning strategy, and hence Abélard can play 'at random', in the sense that any Eloïse should beat any possible play of Abélard's (see Remark 3) . The analysis for the inductive step is analogous to the basic case, since the game proceeds in turns which are pairwise independent -except from the fact that the valuation is extended at each step. In the same way one can show the dual case of ϕ starting with ↑∃x 1|ρ 1 ∀y 1 |τ 1 . . . ∃x k|ρ k ∀y k |τ k ψ.
Proof of item 1 of Theorem 16. It follows directly from Definition 13 that for every SL(↓)-formula ϕ in prenex normal form, T (ϕ) is a SO w -formula (incidentally, also prenex normal form). This, together with Lemma 17, concludes the proof of the first part of Theorem 16.
For the proof of item 2 of Theorem 16, we define a translation S that maps SO w -formulas in prenex normal form with only shallow terms (cf. Proposition 12) to equivalent SL(↓)-formulas. If ψ is quantifier-free, then S(ψ) = ψ. Now, suppose we are given a formula of the form:
where n > 0, m ≥ 0 and ψ = ∀hψ . Every occurrence of g k in ψ is a shallow term g k (t k ), where,t k denotes a tuple of first-order variables whose dimension is the arity of g k (t k = λ when g k is a first-order variable). Since ϕ has weak dependencies,t k can only contain variables free in ψ, including those symbols g 1 , . . . , g n , f 1 , . . . , f m of arity zero (i.e. first-order variables). In particular, by Assumption 9, no variable that is bound in ψ may occur int k . For k = 1, . . . , n, lett
a set of tuples of fresh variables where the dimension of eachȳ i k coincides with the arity of g k . We then define S(ϕ) as:
There are two key points in the above definition of S(ϕ). One is that the substitution σ U eliminates every occurrence of g k in ψ. The other is that in the recursive use of S we use a less complex SO w -formula (in particular, the ∀-prefix may be of length zero). The dual case (i.e., that when ϕ starts with a ∀) is analogous.
Lemma 18. If x is a first-order variable and ϕ is a SO w -formula then S(∃xϕ) ≡ c ↓∃xS(ϕ) and S(∀xϕ) ≡ c ↑∀xS(ϕ).
Proof. We show S(∃xϕ) ≡ c ↓∃xS(ϕ). The case when ϕ starts with ∀ is immediate. Suppose ϕ is of the form (14), i.e. ϕ = ∃g 1 . . . ∃g n ∀f 1 . . . ∀f m ψ, and assume g 1 is of arity 0. Using the nomenclature used above, we have that l 1 = 1, since the only tuplet such that g 1 (t) occurs in ψ is the empty tuplet = (); on the other hand, since the dimension ofȳ . . .
Now the first existential quantifier is independent of all the previous variables quantified universally (i.e. those variables in Y . . .
, which is clearly equivalent in classical contexts to S(∃g 2 . . . ∃g n ∀f 1 . . . ∀f m ψ).
The case S(∀xϕ) ≡ c ↑∀xS(ϕ) is analogous. This concludes the proof of Lemma 18.
Proof of item 2 of Theorem 16. We prove that A |= SO ϕ[v] iff A |= + S(ϕ) [v] by induction on the number of quantifier alternations in ϕ. The property is trivially true when ϕ is quantifier-free, so assume instead that ϕ is of the form (14) -the dual case being analogous. Clearly, ϕ is equivalent to:
where τ is a substitution of
. This means that all occurrences of g k in ψτ are shallow. Furthermore, (17) is equivalent to ϕ defined as:
withψ a SO w -formula in prenex normal form, equivalent to ¬χ ∨ (ψτ ) and with the same number of quantifier alternations as ψτ (Proposition 12). A simple inspection shows that ϕ is a SO w -formula as well. Call ϕ the result of stripping the ∃-prefix from ϕ . Then,
, iff (Lemma 18):
which holds (using again the identity ↓∃x↓χ ≡ c ↓∃xχ) iff:
Now, the key observation is that (20) . . .
and τ substitutes all the occurrences of g(ȳ 
The connection with the logic of Henkin quantifiers
We have shown in the preceding sections that when one adds classical negation to SL (or IF, for that matter) in the way suggested by Hodges [6] , one lands in a rather weak fragment of SO. But this way of incorporating negation may seem arbitrary, so one may wonder whether this was a sensible definition in the first place. We will argue in this section that this is indeed the case. To see this, we resort to Henkin quantifiers.
As an example of the simplest (non-trivial) Henkin quantifier, consider formula:
Semantics are usually given using a Skolemization; for instance, (22) is equivalent to the Σ
More generally (we follow here the presentation in [17] ), a Henkin prefix can be defined as a triple Q = A Q , E Q , D Q where A Q and E Q are disjoint sets of variables (universal and existential, respectively) Q, and D Q ⊆ A Q × E Q is a dependency relation. When (y, x) ∈ D Q , we say that the existential variable y depends on the universal variable x in Q. Moreover, if D Q is the union of n complete bipartite graphs, then we can write Q in matritial form using n rows, as in (22) . L * is the extension of FO with Henkin prefixes (i.e., they may occur wherever a first-order quantifier is allowed to occur) while L * 1 is the fragment composed by formulas of the form Qψ with ψ first-order.
The Skolemization of Qϕ, denoted sk(Qϕ), is defined as the result of substituting in ϕ all the free occurrences y i ∈ E Q by f y i (x i ), wherex i is a tuple containing every x such that (y i , x) ∈ D Q . All the f y i are assumed fresh. We then define |= L * by extending |= FO with the semantic clause:
, for some functions F 1 , . . . , F k on A interpreting the f y 1 , . . . , f y k introduced by Skolemization.
The reason we are interested in these logics comes from the following well-known result, a direct corollary of the equivalences of Σ The crucial connection is that L * can be regarded as the result of adding classical negation to L * 1 , in an iterated way, in exactly the same way as SL(↓) is obtained from SL (for a formal treatment of this notion, cf. [19] ). We then have the following: Theorem 20. L * is equivalent to SO w and, therefore, to SL(↓) as well.
Proof. It is straightforward to encode the semantics of an L * -formula ϕ as a SO-formula T (ϕ). The only case that introduces second-order quantification is T (Qψ) = ∃f y 1 . . . ∃f y k ∀x 1 . . . ∀x l T (sk(Qψ)) and one only needs to observe that if f y i (t) occurs in sk(Qψ) thent is a tuple of variables among x 1 . . . x l . Hence, T (ϕ) is in SO w . The argument for the other inclusion is a straightforward modification of the proof of Theorem 16, item 2; one simply needs to replace γ defined in (21) by:
and then argue in an analogous way.
An aside: truth-definitions in the analytic hierarchy
The results of this section appear in [7, 8] . We include them in this aside section for the sake of completeness and readability. Let N be the standard model of Peano Arithmetic over the signature σ = 0, 1, +, × . For every n > 0, let σ n denote the extension of σ with unary function symbols f 1 . . . f n . We say that a Σ 1 n -formula is normalized if it has the form ∃f 1 ∀f 2 ∃f 3 . . . Qf n ψ where ψ is a FO formula over σ n . Notice that every quantifier is immediately followed by its dual so Q = ∀ iff n is even. Proof. The is a standard result that follows from the expressibility in N of a pairing function [20] .
We assume a computable Gödelization that assigns a number α to every second-order term or formula α (over signature σ, assuming any f i may occur as a second-order variable). Moreover, we assume the usual formula manipulation functions; thus, given ϕ , we will write, ¬ϕ for the Gödel number of the formula that results of negating ϕ, ∃xϕ for the Gödel number of the formula that results from prepending ∃x to ϕ. Furthermore, sometimes we will mix logical symbols and natural numbers, as in ∃xp, for x, p ∈ N, to denote the formula ∃yϕ where y = x and ϕ = p.
For every n > 0 we assume the following primitive recursive predicates and functions:
1. Var(x) holds iff x is the Gödel number of a first-order variable.
2. Trm σn (t) holds iff t is the Gödel number of a closed term over σ n . 6. In Σ 1 n (p) holds iff ∃f p has at most n − 1 SO-quantifier alternations.
Frm
holds (t is the numeral of t).
( ϕ ) holds and ψ is the matrix of ϕ.
Since these are primitive recursive, they can be expressed in the FO-language of σ. Fix two second-order variables v and X and let T n (v, X) be the conjunction of the formulas in Table 1 . All but S1 are the standard way of describing, in FO, a truth-predicate X for FO-sentences over σ n and a valuation function v for closed FO-terms over σ n (see, e.g. [21] ). S1, on the other hand, looks rather unusual and is the only axiom referring to Σ 1 n -sentences. Finally, define the SO-formulas over σ n :
Lemma 22. Let ϕ be a Σ 1 n -sentence over σ, let ψ be its Σ 1 n normalized form and let ψ 0 be the matrix of ψ. Moreover, let θ n be any of θ ∃ n or θ ∀ n . For any F 1 , . . . , F n interpreting f 1 , . . . , f n , the following are equivalent: Table 1 : T n (v, X) is the conjunction of these formulas. X is used as a unary predicate but can be assumed to be a unary function with image in {0, 1}.
1. (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ) |= FO ψ 0 2. (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ) |= SO θ n ( ψ 0 ) 3. (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ) |= SO θ n ( ψ ) 4. (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ) |= SO θ n ( ϕ ) Proof. We show only the case for θ n = θ ∃ n . We first show that if either 2, 3 or 4 hold, then 1 holds as well. Let χ ∈ {ϕ, ψ, ψ 0 } and assume that (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ) |= SO θ ∃ n ( χ ). That means that for someX andṽ, (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ,X,ṽ) |= FO T n (v, X) ∧ X( χ ). By S1, we may conclude that (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ,X,ṽ) |= FO T n (v, X) ∧ X( ψ 0 ); moreover all the other formulas makeṽ andX uniquely determined on the Gödel number of closed terms and sentences over σ n , respectively. Hence, we conclude that (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ) |= FO ψ 0 . Now we show that if 1 holds, then 2, 3 and 4 hold too. Assume then that (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ) |= FO ψ 0 . We know that F 1 , . . . , F n induce a unique valuation γ on closed terms and a unique set Ψ 0 of FO-formulas over σ n that are true in (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ), from which ψ 0 ∈ Ψ 0 by assumption. Moreover, Ψ 0 induces the unique set Ψ of normalized Σ 1 n -formulas such that χ ∈ Ψ iff the matrix of χ is in Ψ 0 , so ψ ∈ Ψ. Finally, Ψ induces the unique set of Σ 1 n -formulas Φ such that χ ∈ Φ iff its normalized Σ 1 n -form is in Ψ, from which ϕ ∈ Φ. Letṽ be any function such that, for any closed term t over σ n ,ṽ( t ) = γ(t) and letX = { χ | χ ∈ Ψ 0 ∪ Ψ ∪ Φ}. By construction, we have that (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ,X,ṽ) |= T n (v, X) ∧ X( ψ 0 ) ∧ X( ψ ) ∧ X( ϕ ), so (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ) |= θ ∃ n ( χ ) for χ ∈ {ψ 0 , ψ, ϕ}. The main result of this section is that the truth-predicate for Σ 1 n -sentences over N is a Σ 1 n -set in the analytic hierarchy. This is formally stated as follows:
Theorem 23. For all n > 0 there is a Σ 1 n -formula τ n (x) over σ such that for every Σ 1 n -sentence ϕ over σ, N |= SO ϕ iff N |= SO τ n ( ϕ ).
Proof. We discuss the case for n odd, the even case being analogous. Define, then τ n (x) := ∃f 1 ∀f 2 . . . ∃f n θ ∃ n (x), which is clearly Σ 1 n since θ ∃ n (x) is Σ 1 n . For the "only if" case, assume N |= SO ϕ, which implies N |= SO ∃f 1 ∀f 2 . . . ∃f n ψ 0 where ψ 0 is the matrix of a normalized Σ 1 n -sentence equivalent to ϕ. This means there is a strategy for Eloïse in the standard gamesemantics for SO that allows her to reach to a position such that (N, F 1 , . . . , F n ) |= FO ψ 0 regardless what Abélard plays. By Lemma 22, this same strategy is also winning when playing over formula ∃f 1 ∀f 2 . . . ∃f n θ ∃ n ( ϕ ), which means that N |= SO τ n ( ϕ ). The converse case is analogous. Now, observe that if τ n (x) is the Σ 1 n -truth-predicate for Σ 1 n -sentences, then τ n ( ϕ ) := ¬τ n ( ¬ϕ ) is a Π 1 n -truth-predicate for Π 1 n -sentences. Therefore, we get the dual result:
Corollary 24. For all n > 0 there is a Π 1 n -formula τ n (x) over σ such that for every Π 1 n -sentence ϕ over σ, N |= SO ϕ iff N |= SO τ n ( ϕ ).
We say that a logic L is arithmetically reducible to Σ We conjecture that this result holds for the case n = 1.
Discussion
The motivation for the research reported in this paper was an interest in understanding what are the properties of IF with classical negation, as defined by Hodges [6] . Taking as starting point the equivalent, game-theoretical semantics introduced in [9] , we first found a characterization of SL(↓) in terms of a syntactic fragment of SO and proved that this
